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Peeking Behind Judical Robes:
A First Amendment Analysis of Confidential
Investigations of the Judiciary
By CYDNEY ANN HURowlTz*
Introduction
Judges wield great power in our society and such power may
easily be abused. In the 1960's and 70's, many states estab-
lished commissions on judicial performance to investigate the
complaints against judges and to provide for an effective proc-
ess to discipline and remove judges. Recently, the investiga-
tion of the California Supreme Court has brought into focus
the fact that many of the operations of such commissions are
confidential.
This confidentiality has not been challenged. Yet confiden-
tial judicial or quasi-judicial hearings conflict with the public's
right of access to government information, a component of the
right to know which is protected by the free speech and free
press clause of the First Amendment. The perimeters of this
right of access are not clear; but this is a time when confidence
in the ability of the legal system to dispense justice appears to
be waning amid controversy over whether confidentiality of
proceedings protects judicial process or merely deepens public
suspicion about the courts.
This note will discuss the various state procedures and confi-
dentiality rules, and the reasons behind them. The public's
right to know and the interests furthered by open proceedings
will then be analyzed. Finally, the conflict between these inter-
ests will be explored, and the constitutionality of confidential-
ity rules will be considered.




Procedures for the Investigation
and Removal of Judges
Judicial misconduct is a disturbing problem. There is a pub-
lic sense of unease about the quality of our judges. Extreme
and sensational cases of misconduct are occasionally reported
in the press. For example, a Georgia trial judge was disbarred
in 1961 for offering "protection" to a businessman for money.'
A Virginia judge was convicted in 1968 of seventeen counts of
forgery and obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 A Califor-
nia judge was removed from office by the state Supreme Court
after it was shown that he had prodded a deputy public de-
fender with a "dildo" during a conference in chambers and had
grabbed a Court Commissioner's testicles in a public corridor.3
Still another California judge was removed after a finding that
she had committed twenty-one acts constituting wilful miscon-
duct in office and eight acts of "conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute."'
These cases, however, are atypical; the usual case is less dra-
matic. The authority of a trial judge to control both the admin-
istration of the trial and the conduct of counsel can be abused
when judicial functions are expanded and judicial power is
used to sway the jury or to intimidate witnesses. Other types
of misconduct include: excessive drinking; lack of punctuality;
short hours; extreme rudeness to lawyers, litigants, and wit-
nesses; insufficient trial preparation; and disability caused by
health or age.'
The traditional methods of relief from such misconduct are
impeachment, address, and recall. Impeachment is used in the
federal system and in forty-six states. It is a legislative pro-
ceeding in which the lower house acts as a grand jury and the
upper house acts as a trial court. This method is inadequate; it
1. Clinkscales v. State, 104 Ga. App. 723, 123 S.E.2d 165 (1961).
2. W.T. BRArwArE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 5 (1971).
3. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 110 Cal. Rptr.
201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973).
4. Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 681, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 778, 779, 537 P.2d 898, 899 (1975).
5. See BRArHwATE, supra note 2, at 5; Buckley, The Commission on Judicial




is time consuming, expensive, and cumbersome because it re-
quires mobilization of an entire legislature.
Address is a formal request from a state legislature to the
governor asking for removal of a judge. This method is also
inadequate for the same reasons as stated above.
Recall is used in seven states. If a designated percentage of
the voters sign a petition to recall a judge, he must face a spe-
cial election. The difficulties inherent in finding people with
time to prepare and circulate a popular petition make recall as
inadequate as impeachment and address.'
These three methods are in actuality rarely used. Impeach-
ment is used more often than recall or address, but it is still
employed only sporadically. In federal courts, impeachment
remains the only method of removal.'
Most states, however, have established alternative methods
for investigation and removal of judges. Forty-seven states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico now use such alternative
methods for inquiring into judicial disability and misconduct.9
Only three states have not followed the trend. In Maine judges
may be removed only by impeachment or address, 0 while in
Mississippi and Washington impeachment is the only means of
removal."
While each state's system is slightly different, they share
certain features. Generally, a special commission is estab-
lished to receive and. investigate complaints against judges.
The commissions are usually composed of judges, lawyers and
citizens. The judges and lawyers are usually appointed by
their peers, while the citizen representatives are commonly ap-
pointed by the governor. Upon receiving a complaint, or on
their own initiative, these commissions conduct a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there is cause for removal,
forced retirement, or some other disciplinary measure.1 2 Upon
finding good cause, most order a formal hearing.'" After the
hearing, if a commission decides the charges have been sus-
6. Buckley, supra note 5, at 250.
7. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 13.
8. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 382 U.S.
1003, 1004-06 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 834 (1978).
10. ME. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
11. MISS. CONST. § 53; WASH. CONST. art. 5 § 2.
12. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 605.28 (West 1975).
13. See, e.g., D. C. CODE § 11-1527 (1973).
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tained, it files the charge with the state supreme court and rec-
ommends reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or
retirement.14 In some states, a special court is convened to
conduct this formal hearing.'" Others provide for the appoint-
ment of special masters to fulfill that function.'" With either
system, the state supreme court has follow-up authority to de-
cide the proper sanction." The supreme court, in most state
systems, reviews the record and may hear additional evidence
if it desires.'" The court then enters its order for whatever ac-
tion it deems appropriate, or it may reject the commission's
recommendation altogether and dismiss the charges.'"
Forty-seven states provide for confidentiality of the judicial
disciplinary proceedings,2 0 though they differ as to the length
of time confidentiality is compelled during and after these pro-
ceedings. In some states, confidentiality extends only through
the preliminary investigation. If the commission decides there
is a reasonable basis to charge a judge with misconduct or in-
capacity, it orders a formal hearing. At that time the charge
becomes public, and all further proceedings are public." In
these states, the operation of the commission is similar to that
of a grand jury.
Other states provide for confidentiality of commission pro-
ceedings until formal charges are filed with the supreme court.
Then the record of the investigation and preliminary hearing is
made public. All further proceedings are public.2 2
Four states provide for confidentiality of records and pro-
ceedings of the commission if a charge is filed with the
supreme court, whose proceedings are governed by its regular
14. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, § 13, III(b).
15. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1658 (West Supp. 1979-80).
16. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 1-2103 (1979).
17. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN § 22-145 (1962).
18. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. V, § 30(2).
19. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18(h).
20. See Appendix for a list of state provisions.
21. ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 156(b), § 6.17 of Amend. No. 328 (1973); FLA. CONST. art. 5,
§ 12(D); ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15(e); IND. CODE § 33-2.1-5-3(b) (1975); MINN. R. BD. ON JUD.
STANDARDS 5; MO. COMM'N ON RETIREMENT, REMOVAL AND DISCIPLINE 12.23; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 1658 (West Supp. 1979-80); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.93 (West 1980); W. VA. R.
P. FOR HANDLING COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES 11-10.
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-145(f), 22-1004(b) (1979); IDAHO CODE § 1-2103 (1976); LA.
R. JUD. COMM'N 10; MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377 (1979); N.Y.
JUD. LAw § 44(7) (McKinney Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.420(4) (1977); PA. CONST.
art. 5, § 18(h); PA. R. P. JUD. INQUIRY & REV. BD. 20; S.C. SUP. CT. R. 33(b); TEX. CONST.
art. 5, § la(10).
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 3 The case is reported like other ap-
peals.
Some states provide for confidentiality of all papers and pro-
ceedings but allow the final consideration by the supreme
court to be public if the judge under investigation so re-
quests.24 In Utah and South Carolina, after the supreme court
enters its final order, the record beomes available for public
scrutiny, unless the discipline ordered is a private reprimand.2 5
The District of Columbia and Virginia also allow disclosure if a
subsequent perjury prosecution is initiated."
Eleven jurisdictions allow the judge under investigation to
waive confidentiality to some extent. In Arizona, the judge
may request the release of information to the public. Seven
states give the judge the option of waiving confidentiality com-
pletely.2" Under the latter system, if the judge so opts, the for-
mal hearing and record of the preliminary investigation
become public. In Kentucky and New York, the judge may re-
quest that the record be made public. 29 In the District of Co-
lumbia, if no grounds are found for the charge, the judge may
request that the record be made public."o Otherwise, it re-
mains confidential.
In ten states all papers filed and the proceedings of the com-
mission are confidential, with only the final recommendation to
the supreme court made public.3 1
Some states allow the commission discretion to issue a short
statement to the public if (1) the investigation has already be-
23. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 13; KAN. STAT. § 20-176 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 16-1A (1979); VT. SUP. CT. R. DISCIPLINARY CONTROL OF JUDGES 6(10).
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1528 (1973); HAW. REV. STAT. § 610-12(b) (1976); VA. CODE
§ 2.1-37.13 (1979).
25. S.C. SUP. CT. R. 33(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-30(3) (1977).
26. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1528 (1973); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1979).
27. Aniz. CONST. art. 6 § 1; ARIz. R. P. COMM'N ON JUD. QUALS. 10.
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-511, 51-51n, 51-51j (1979); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; DEL.
R. P. CT ON JUD. 10(d); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 13; GA. R. JUD. QUALS. COMM'N 18; IND.
CONST. art. 7, § 11(2); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-5-3(a) (1975); MINN. R. BD. OF JUD. STAN-
DARDS 5(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.420(2) (1977).
29. KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.130(3); N.Y. JUD. LAw 45 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1528 (1973).
31. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(f); COLO. CONST. art. VI § 23(3)(d); KAN. STAT. § 20-176;
KAN. SUP. CT. R. RELATING TO JUD. CONDUCT 607; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-723;
MONT. R JUD. STANDARDS COMM'N 7; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 30(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-
726 (1979); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21(5); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 28; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32; R.I.
R. COMM'N JUD. TENURE & DISCIPLINE 20 & 21; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; VA. CODE § 2.1-
37.13.
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come known, (2) there is broad public interest, and (3) confi-
dence in the administration of justice is threatened.3 2 In South
Carolina and Vermont, such a statement may be issued at the
request of the judge under investigation rather than at the
commission's discretion.3 3 Missouri also allows the commis-
sion to issue a public statement if the judge was cleared but
the charge has become public. 4
Four states make disclosure before the proceedings become
public a punishable offense, usually contempt of court.35 In
Hawaii such disclosure is a felony punishable by not more
than $5,000 or less than five years imprisonment, or both.
There are many reasons advanced for these confidentiality
provisions. Many complaints are rejected after an initial inves-
tigation discloses that the charges are frivolous or outside the
commission's jurisdiction. 7 Submission of other complaints
sometimes constitutes an attempt to use the commission to ap-
peal from an adverse judgment. Such complaints are quickly
disposed of.
When the system provides for confidentiality until a final
recomendation is made, the reputations of the accused judge,
and of the judiciary, are protected until a full-scale investiga-
tion has been made and a competent body of peers has made a
decision on the merits. This is similar to the protection af-
forded a defendant under grand jury procedure.
Where a charge is minor, confidentiality allows the judge to
correct perhaps unintentional transgressions and preserves
his reputation while the corrective influence of the commission
is exerted. Thus, a judge who would be reluctant to change his
ways publicly, fearing that the public would see this as an ad-
mission of guilt, can privately improve the quality of his serv-
ice. In this respect, confidentiality serves as an "educative
tool."38
32. GA. R. JUD. QUALS. COMM'N 18; Ky. SUP. CT. R. 4.130(1); LA. R. JUD. COMM'N 10;
MD. R. OF PROCEDURE 1227; MINN. R. BD. JUD. STANDARDS 5(b); Mo. R. COMM'N ON RE-
TIREMENT, REMOVAL & DISCIPLINE 12.23(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.93(2) (West 1980); W.
VA. R. P. FOR HANDLING COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES & MAGISTRATES 5.
33. S.C. SUP. CT. R. 33(C); VT. SUP. CT. R. FOR DiscIPLINARY CONTROL 6(12).
34. Mo. R. COMM'N ON RETIREMENT, REMOVAL & DISCIPLINE 12.23(b).
35. FLA. R. JUD. QUALS. COMM'N 25; Ky. Sup. CT. R. 4.130(3); PA. R. JUD. INQUIRY &
REV. BD. 1(C); VT. SUP. CT. R. FOR DISCIPLINARY CONTROL OF JUDGES 6(10).
36. HAW. REV. STAT. § 610-3(b) (1976).
37. Buckley, supra note 5, at 253.
38. Id. at 255.
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At any time during the proceedings, a judge's decision to re-
sign or retire ends the process. Usually, if the situation is seri-
ous enough to warrant termination of service, a judge will
voluntarily leave his or her post. Confidentiality allows the
judge to do this and so avoid the time, expense and spectacle of
a public trial. This solves the problem of the judge's miscon-
duct while preventing a harmful effect on the public image of
the judiciary. In the six years after the California commission
was initiated, forty-four judges voluntarily left the bench dur-
ing an investigation of their conduct in office.3 9
Another reason for confidentiality is that it allows the com-
missions to overcome opposition of the judiciary to their for-
mation. Competent and discrete handling of cases has
eradicated judicial resistance,4 0 and judicial cooperation has in
fact helped the process to work smoothly.
In sum, most judicial disability or misconduct cases con-
ducted by special commissions end with the judge correcting
his behavior or voluntarily resigning or retiring. The public im-
age of the judiciary is thus protected, and at the same time ju-
dicial performance is improved. The commissions have been
effective in improving the quality of judges; supporters of confi-
dentiality assert that that result would be lost by public pro-
ceedings.
II
The Public Right to Know
The purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the free-
dom to publish matters of public concern, to ensure the right of
free discussion, and to allow citizens to criticize the conduct of
the government and governmental officials in the exercise of
their authority." Where speech concerns public affairs, it is
the "essence of self-government." The clause granting free-
dom of speech and of the press was intended as one of the
39. Id. at 256.
40. Id. at 260.
41. 2 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed.
1927).
42. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326




guarantees of the people's right to know.4 3 In Madison's words,
"The right of freely examining public characters and measures,
and of free communication thereon, is the only effective guard-
ian of every other right."" Although protection of the right to
know is not the sole purpose of the First Amendment, it is cer-
tainly a major element.
The Constitution, of course, does not contain an express pro-
vision for this right. Professor Henkin asserts that this is be-
cause the framers perceived such rights as retained by the
people to be safeguarded against governmental infringement.
Thus, although it may have been the principal rationale for
freedom of the press, the right to know is a derivative of the
right to publish and is coextensive with it.46
That the Constitution protects the right to receive informa-
tion and ideas is now well established, and this right is recog-
nized as fundamental to our free society.4 7 However, a
problem area is the right to seek out information, the most po-
tentially significant aspect of the right to know. This is particu-
larly true of the right to receive information from the
government." MoreQver, the right to acquire information is a
corollary of the right to publish. The flow of information to the
public, guaranteed by freedom of the press, is curtailed as
ways of acquiring it are blocked. When news is cut off at its
source, the right to publish is compromised." Thus, some right
to gather information must exist.
The right to acquire and disseminate information is essential
for informed decision-making in a democratic society. It is "vi-
tal as a mechanism for effectuating social change without re-
sort to violence or undue coercion."o In a democracy there
must be public discussion of public issues, and the communi-
cation of information bearing on those issues must not be in-
fringed by the government. Theoretically, government is the
people's agent in a democracy, and the people as ultimate gov-
43. Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the
Constitution, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1957).
44. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (Hunt ed. 1906).
45. Emerson, Legal Foundation of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 14.
46. Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1971).
47. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
48. Emerson, supra note 45, at 14.
49. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall,
J.J., dissenting); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
50. Emerson, supra note 45, at 2.
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ernors must have absolute freedom of opinions and beliefs."
Many cases have emphasized the importance of the First
Amendment guarantees to our system of representative self-
government.52
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right
to know on a number of occasions. The concept, as understood
by the Court, was first clearly expressed in Lamont v. Postmas-
ter General.5 3 A statute permitting the government to hold
communist propaganda arriving in the mails from abroad was
found to place an unjustifiable burden on the addressee's First
Amendment right to acquire information. In Stanley v. Geor-
gia," a decision upholding the right to possess pornography at
home, the Court stated, "It is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas."s" In another 1969 decision, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,16 the Court held that "[iut is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."5
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amend-
ment guarantees at least minimal access to certain governmen-
51. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257.
The view of Professor Meiklejohn is that the First Amendment was the devise by
which the people reserved significant powers to themselves. These powers, which he
labels powers of "governing importance," are concerned with the governmental re-
sponsibilities of the public.
Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of informa-
tion and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom unabridged by
our agents. Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over
our governing, they have no power. Over their governing we have sovereign
power.
Id. at 257. Thus, in the Meiklejohn view, freedom of expression in areas of public af-
fairs is an absolute right.
52. See Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
53. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
54. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
55. Id. at 564.
56. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC." Id.
at 390.
57. 395 U.S. at 390. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), also recognized this
right. "We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the
country's welfare. Nor it is suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
tal operations. Thus, even while denying requests by the press
for special access to prisons, the Court has consistently taken
pains to point out that the challenged restrictions do not fore-
close all access, implying that some access is required." Court
decisions have many times alluded to the fact that the First
Amendment was adopted to insure a vehicle by which the peo-
ple would have access to information necessary for self-govern-
ment.59
The courts have also consistently enforced the right of the
public to be informed when the legislative or executive
branches have attempted to conduct public business in secret.
In fact, the judiciary deserves the credit for upholding the fun-
damental doctrine that allowable secrecy in government is a
rare exception.o
Yet the right to know remains obscure, and the Supreme
Court has even ignored the guarantee at times. In Zemel v.
Rusk," blanket restrictions on the right to travel to Cuba were
upheld. In the later case of Kleindienst v. Mandel62 the Court
refused to give weight to the right of American citizens to hear
a foreign lecturer who had been denied a visa.
The current status of the right to know, particularly the right
of access to government information, is unclear. One reason
for this state of affairs is that the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment is a relatively new area of law-
most cases construing it having been decided only within the
last fifty years-and so is recognized as being a likely subject
of change by the Court.6 3 The case of New York Times Co. v.
58. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
59. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1971);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1966)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
61. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). The ban on travel was upheld for "[tihe right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Id. at 17
(emphasis added). The necessary implication is that some right to gather information
does exist.
62. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). Note that although the Court refused to consider the First
Amendment rights of the American in this case, it did recognize and discuss the gen-
eral First Amendment right to receive information and ideas.
63. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv..L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1965).
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Sullivan,6 4 for example, has been seen as departing from pre-
vious tests and as adopting an interpretation similar to that of
Professor Meiklejohn.5 But that doctrine's status is further
obscured by two recent cases, Houchins v. KQED, Inc. and
Gannett v. DePasquale.66
Houchins concerned access by the press to certain areas in
the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, California. It was a 3-1-
3 decision with Justices Marshall and Blackmun not participat-
ing. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White
stated that there was no right of access to all sources of govern-
ment information. Justice Stewart concurred in the result but
felt that the press was entitled to more rights of access than
the others had allowed. Justice Stevens, joined in a strong dis-
senting opinion by Justices Brennan and Powell, supported
the public right to know the operations of government and to
have access to them.
In Gannett the Supreme Court held that pre-trial proceed-
ings in a criminal case can be closed to the public under certain
circumstances. The decision centered on a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial but, in dicta, members of the
Court disagreed as to the public's right of access. In an opinion
by Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which Brennan, White and Marshall joined, a separate right
of access by the public was strongly supported.
Thus, it is clear that there is disagreement among the mem-
bers of the Court about the status of the right to know and
about the extent to which the public is entitled to have access
to government information.
There has been legislative acceptance of the right to obtain
information from government. This is demonstrated by the
Freedom of Information Act" and by many state Sunshine
Laws. Recognition of the right is also revealed in the legisla-
64. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case states that freedom of speech and press prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory statement relating to official
misconduct unless he proves that statement was made with "actual malice," that is,
with knowlege that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
65. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 209. See note 51 and accompanying text, supra.
66. 438 U.S. 1 (1978); 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
67. 443 U.S. at 406.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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tive history of the Freedom of Information Act,69 which was in-
tended to insure maximum disclosure of information held by
governmental agencies.
Scope of the Public Right to Know
It is now well settled that the free speech.right is governed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
is protected from impairment by the states.7 o The prevailing
view is that when a provision of the Bill of Rights, such as the
free speech clause, is enforced against the states, it is enforced
according to the same standards that apply against the federal
government.7 ' This is especially true regarding the entire First
Amendment.7 2 Moreover, according to federal standards, the
First Amendment is to be given the broadest scope possible.
The right to know is included in the First Amendment rights
applicable to the states and must therefore be given a broad
scope, coextensive with that Amendment. This is because the
protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond guarantees specifi-
cally enumerated and protects as well "those equally funda-
mental personal rights necessary to make the express
guarantees fully meaningful."7 As was discussed earlier, the
right to know, though not fully defined, is essential to make the
right of a free press meaningful.
The right of public access to judicial proceedings is a compo-
nent of the right to know. It extends beyond the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial and rests on broader First Amendment
foundations.75 The First Amendment protection of the public
right to know differs, in its application to judicial proceedings,
from the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair trial in three
ways. First, it is based on the right of free discussion rather
than on concern for just results in a particular case. Second,
although the parties involved may wish to close a proceeding,
69. Note, Access to Government Information and the Classification Process-Is
There a Right to Know?, 17 N.Y.L. FORUM 814, 819 (1971); Emerson, supra note 45, at 15.
70. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976); Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U.S. 60 (1959); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
71. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
72. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191, 195 (1964).
73. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
74. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).




the First Amendment, unlike the Sixth Amendment, compels
an examination of the public interest as well. This is because
the parties in an action are not concerned with the First
Amendment rights of others. Third, the First Amendment
right to know applies to civil as well as criminal trials."
Very often the judicial process in civil cases is of no signifi-
cance to anyone other than the litigants, but that is not always
the case. 7 Finally, although the First Amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . ," it has been applied to
the executive and the judicial branches of government as
well.78 Thus, rules of court may not violate First Amendment
rights.
The press enjoys the same right of access to public proceed-
ings as the public in general.79 However, the press does not
have a right of access greater than that of the public.80 The
press is therefore free to report what goes on in open court but
is not granted any special access to otherwise closed proceed-
ings."'
In sum, the scope of the First Amendment right to know ex-
tends to limit the governmental power of the states to the same
extent that it limits the federal government. This means that it
must be given the broadest scope possible. It is distinct from
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and applies to civil
as well as criminal trials. Further, this right may not be
abridged by the executive branch or by the judiciary.
The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are not un-
limited or unqualified though. And the right to know, like
other First Amendment rights, is subject to reasonable restric-
tions when necessary to protect the public interest.
The government has always asserted the right to conceal
some information. There were secret proceedings in Philadel-
phia in 1787, and the Constitution provides for publication of a
Congressional Journal for each House except for those parts
76. Id. at 862. See also Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Pub-
lic Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARv. L REV. 1899 (1978).
77. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
78. Henkin, supra note 46, at 277 (Emphasis added).
79. 573 F.2d at 861.
80. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
81. United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 203 Misc. 220, 120 N.Y.S.2d 642, afd, 281 App.
Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1953).
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deemed secret.8 2 The President is also privileged to keep some
secrets.8" The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this
privilege because of the need for some secrecy in executive ac-
tivities. 84
There are various justifications for governmental secrecy.
Military secrecy in time of war is one;8 5 national security in
peacetime,8 6 the need to conduct foreign policy, 7 and the
proper exercise of state police power" are others.
The power to abridge First Amendment freedoms, however,
is the exception rather than the rule, and there must be a rea-
sonable apprehension of danger to the public interest or to
organized government to allow such restriction." Exceptions
to the right to know should be limited to those absolutely es-
sential to the effective operation of government.90 Whether
such restrictions are necessary has been determined by using
the "clear and present danger" test, first formulated in Schenk
v. United States.91 This test has not been rigidly or mechani-
cally applied, however, and each case depends upon the sub-
stantiality of the public interest being protected and upon the
extent to which First Amendment freedoms are abridged.
Thus, in each case the court must balance these two factors.9 2
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
83. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
84. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1964); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
85. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
86. Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947
(1950); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223
F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
87. Henkin, supra note 46, at 275. Diplomatic communications are confidential be-
cause disclosure might cause chaos or unfair advantages to the recipient.
88. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
89. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
90. Emerson, supra note 45, at 16.
91. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (restriction must be necessary to prevent a grave and imme-
diate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect). The test formu-
lated in Schenk has been modified by later cases. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 510 (1951), the Court held that the gravity of the evil must be discounted by its
improbability and that only those means necessary can be used where a restriction on
speech is permissible. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), the Court em-
phasized that the danger must be imminent.
In the recent case of Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978),
the Supreme Court, in considering a state's ability to punish a third person for breach-
ing the confidentiality of a judicial investigation, questioned the relevance of the clear
and present danger test but relied on cases which are couched in clear and present
danger terms for its decision. Id. at 839-46.
92. See note 96 and accompanying text, infra.
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III
Resolving the Conflict Between Confidentiality of
Judicial Investigations and the Public
Right to Know
Typical Approaches to Such Conflicts
As previously discussed, the rights protected by the First
Amendment are not absolute rights, though limitations are
permissible only in exceptional cases.9 3 Limitations are per-
mitted only if the interest being protected is substantial and
there is a public interest that is "compelling" or "paramount."9 4
Legislative restrictions are allowed only to prevent a grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state or federal gov-
ernment may lawfully protect.9 5 Statutes that infringe on First
Amendment freedoms but are not sufficiently justified are null
and void.9 6 Where legislation is alleged to violate these free-
doms, a court must examine the effects of the infringement and
weigh them against the substantiality of the reasons for the re-
striction.
The court, in each case, balances the extent to which the pro-
tected rights are violated against the substantiality of the so-
cial interest sought to be furthered by the restriction."
Judicial balancing of competing interests is required even for
the "preferred" freedoms of the First Amendment.9 8
However, First Amendment rights are entitled to special
safeguards.99 In First Amendment balancing cases, courts ap-
ply a "least restrictive means" approach. An action which in-
fringes on these rights is allowed only if it cannot be achieved
by less burdensome means."oo Where a less drastic way is
93. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
94. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
95. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
96. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
(1942); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
97. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 912 (1963).
98. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Konigsberg v. State Bar
of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 738.
100. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
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available, the more restrictive actions are impermissible. Jus-
tifiable governmental goals cannot be achieved by unduly
broad means.
Thus, the court must consider the interests protected by con-
fidentiality and weigh them against the public interest in open
proceedings. First Amendment rights are entitled to special
safeguards and can be restricted only when a substantial evil
will otherwise result, when there is a substantial danger to in-
terests which a government may lawfully protect, and where
the restriction is the least intrusive means of achieving the le-
gitimate governmental goal.' 0 '
Interests in Open Proceedings
The interests sought to be protected by confidentiality of ju-
dicial investigations, such as protection of the reputation of the
judiciary, have already been discussed. The countervailing in-
terests in open proceedings will now be examined.
Knowledge of government is essential to the informed deci-
sion-making that is the essence of self-government. "Knowl-
edge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to
be their own governors must arm themselves with the power
knowledge gives. A popular government without popular infor-
mation or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce
or tragedy or perhaps both."102 The public, as sovereign, must
have the maximum possible information for a democracy to
work. 103
In forty states citizens elect their judges, either directly or in
a confirmation or retention election.104 Without knowledge of
U.S. 330 (1972). See also Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Infor-
mation, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amend-
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
101. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text, supra.
102. 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON 398 (Hunt ed. 1906).
103. Emerson, supra note 45, at 14.
104. ALA. CONST. § 6.13 of Amendment No. 328 (1973); ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.080,
22.05.100, 22.10.150, 22.15.195 (1976); ARIz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4,12,32; ARK. CONST. ART. 7,
§§ 6,13,19,20; CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 3,6,16; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 71141 (West 1976); COLO.
CONST. art. 6, § 20(2); FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 10; GA. CONST. art. VI, § II; Paras. III, VIII;
§ III, Para. II; § VII, Para. III; IDAHO CODE § 1-201, 1-702 (1979); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12;
IND. CONST. art. 7, § 11; IOWA CONST. art. 12, § 16; KAN. STAT. §§ 20-105, 25-111 (1979); Ky.
CONST. §§ 110, 113, 140, 99, 142; LA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 4, 9, 15, 22; MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5;
MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8, 12, 16; MINN. CONsT. art. 6, § 7; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-5-235,
23-5-239 (1972); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29 (C) (1); MONT. CONST. art. VII, §§ 5, 8; NEB.
CONST. art. V, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. 6, §§ 3, 5, 7; N.J. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 12, 26; N.Y.
CONST. art. 6, §§ 2, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17; N.C. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 9, 10, 16; N.D. CONST.
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the quality of a judge's performance, an informed vote is not
possible. A cornerstone of American citizenship is the right to
criticize public persons, and it is essential that the record of a
candidate for office, including a judge, be subject to public
scrutiny and discussion. 0 5
Open governmental proceedings ensure that the public can
observe and prevent repressive or unfair actions by the govern-
ment. The "Watergate" investigations demonstrated how vital
exposure of illegal or questionable governmental practices is to
effectuate "government by the people." 06 Thomas Jefferson
believed that liberty could be protected only by such public
scrutiny.0 7
Further, open proceedings preserve the credibility of the ju-
dicial system by making available the testimony and evidence
upon which a judicial determination is made. This opening of
governmental processes to the citizens builds confidence in the
system.08 The public is also educated about governmental
processes and develops a greater understanding of the rule of
law. Secret hearings breed distrust no matter how fair they ac-
tually are. Secret judicial action breeds distrust of the courts
and undermines confidence in the impartiality and compe-
tence of judges. 09
Finally, extensive public scrutiny guards against actual mis-
art. IV, §§ 90, 104, 100, 112, 113; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 3, 9,11, 18;
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 252.050 (1979); PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13; S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. V, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 6, §§ 3; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 6
§§ 3, 4; TEX. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 4, 7; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-7.1 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 2.04.071 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. COST. art. 8, §§ 2, 5, 10; Wis. CONST. art. 7, §§ 4, 7,14,
15; Wyo. CONST. art. 5, §§ 4, 19.
105. According to Cooley, the purpose of the First Amendment was:
to guard against repressive measures by the several departments of the gov-
ernment, by means of which persons in power might secure themselves and
their favorites from just scrutiny and condemnation. . . . The evils to be pre-
vented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the gov-
ernment by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion
of public matters ....
2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed. 1927).
106. Emerson, supra note 45, at 18.
107. In truth it is afflicting that a man who has past his life in serving the public
. . . should yet be liable to have his peace of mind so much disturbed by any
individual who shall think proper to arraign him in a newspaper. It is however
an evil for which there is no remedy. Our liberty depends upon the freedom of
the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.
9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239 (J. Boyd ed. 1954).
108. United States v. Cianfrani 573 F.2d 835, 853 (3d Cir. 1978). See also, 6 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1834, 335 (1979).
109. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976); 573 F.2d at 851.
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carriage of justice. If police, prosecutors, and judicial officials
know they are being observed, they are less likely to engage in
illegal activities. The press often capitalizes on public suspi-
cion of injustice or impropriety, but the fair administration of
justice is a legitimate concern theoretically underlying public-
ity."10
The recent public investigation of the California Supreme
Court was criticized for its "carnival atmosphere." However,
such an atmosphere is not a necessary part of public proceed-
ings and may be prevented by proper administration. Some
criminal trials have engendered widespread publicity, yet fair
trials were still possible."' The cases demonstrate that wide-
spread publicity does not invariably lead to an unfair trial."2
Balancing the Interests
State confidentiality provisions have never been challenged
on First Amendment grounds. In the recent case of Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,"' the Supreme Court held
that a state's interest in confidentiality is not sufficient to jus-
tify punishment of a third person, not a party to the inquiry,
who improperly divulged information regarding confidential
proceedings of the state's judicial review commission. The
Court declined to consider the state's power to keep proceed-
ings confidential or the right of the press to gain access to such
proceedings.14
The recent "Tanner Investigation" of the California Supreme
Court was closed because of a provision in the California Con-
stitution which provides for confidentiality of such proceed-
ings. "' The constitutionality of the provision was not
challenged."' Other state cases in which confidentiality was
considered were also based entirely on state statutory or con-
stitutional confidentiality provisions without any First Amend-
110. Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial
Proceedings, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1899, 1906 (1978).
111. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S.
541 (1962); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
112. 427 U.S. at 554.
113. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
114. "Landmark does not challenge the requirement of confidentiality.... We do
not have before us any constitutional challenge to a State's power to keep the Commis-
sion's proceedings confidential. . . ." Id. at 834, 836-37.
115. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(f).
116. Mosk v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494,
601 P.2d 1030 (1979).
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ment challenge."x7 Thus, no court has ever considered whether
confidential investigations of the judiciary and confidential re-
moval hearings impermissibly abridge the public's right to
know.
As discussed earlier, an analysis of the constitutionality of
confidentiality provisions involves weighing the interests pro-
tected by confidentiality against the interests in open proceed-
ings. In addition, the least restrictive means must be used to
achieve the legislative purpose.
In view of that standard, of all the systems presented the
most desirable are those where the proceedings are confiden-
tial only until a formal hearing is ordered upon a finding of
good cause for the charge."' This procedure most closely par-
allels a grand jury and is the least restrictive alternative. The
interests on both sides are protected. The judge's reputation is
protected against frivolous or malicious complaints, while the
public is allowed access to the consideration of the merits of
the charge. The judge may voluntarily resign or retire before
the formal hearing is held, which allows for a quick solution.
But, if a judge decides to stay and defend himself against the
charge, the appearance of justice and the educative function of
open proceedings are preserved.
Systems which allow the record to become available for pub-
lic scrutiny after a recommendation is filed with the Supreme
Court"' are less desirable under the "least restrictive means"
standard. The public's rights are abridged more than is neces-
sary: although citizens can read the record, they are denied
the right to observe the proceedings. This defeats the educa-
tive function of open proceedings, although preserving the ap-
pearance of justice. Whether these rules would be held
unconstitutional depends upon how much weight the justices
deciding the issue assign to First Amendment rights and how
absolute they believe such rights to be.
Procedures which provide for confidentiality of all proceed-
ings unless the judge under investigation requests otherwise 2 0
are also inadequate to protect the rights of the public. The in-
117. See, e.g., McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512,
116 Cal. Rtpr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 (1974); Nichols v. Gamso, 35 N.Y.2d 35, 315 N.E.2d 770, 358
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974).
118. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
119. See note 22, supra, and accompanying text.
120. See notes 27-30, supra, and accompanying text.
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terest of the public is separate from that of the judge under
investigation and, as in a criminal trial, these societal interests
are often antagonistic to the interests of the judge.'2 1 This
method is too restrictive since the public's right to know is
completely dependent upon whether the judge, in his own in-
terest, requests an open proceeding.
Some states allow for public disclosure only if it has resulted
in broad public knowledge about the proceeding.12 2 Again, this
is overly restrictive. It fallaciously assumes that the public in-
terest arises only upon being informed that there is an investi-
gation under way. Yet the public interest in the fair
administration of justice is pervasive and is perhaps stronger
in the event of secret proceedings.
State rules which provide for confidentiality of all proceed-
ings with no disclosure of the record protect only the interest
of the judge and completely restrict the public's right to know.
There is no balance here; only the reasons supporting confi-
dentiality are weighed. Such procedures could be held uncon-
stitutional, particularly since there are far less restrictive
means available.
Conclusion
The state commissions have been effective in improving the
quality of the judiciary. There are reasons why at least some of
their operations should be confidential. These include protec-
tion against frivolous and malicious complaints, preservation
of the ability of judges to correct unintentional minor trans-
gressions, preservation of the reputation of the judiciary as a
whole, and encouragement of voluntary resignation or retire-
ment.
Some rules provide for confidentiality only until a prelimi-
nary investigation is completed and good cause is found for the
charges. Other states forbid any public disclosure other than
the final disposition of the case. And there are many variations
between these extremes.
There is no explicit statement in the Constitution of the pub-
lic right to know, but it is a corollary of freedom of the press
because without access to information, the right to publish is
curtailed. Further, the right of access to governmental infor-
121. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852 (3d Cir. 1978).
122. See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
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mation is essential in a democracy. Self-government can only
be effective if there is an informed electorate. The right to
know has been repeatedly recognized by the courts, although
its scope and perimeters remain unclear. There is no doubt,
however, that this right exists and that state confidentiality
rules must be balanced against it.
Some of the state confidentiality provisions present no prob-
lem. Where the preliminary investigation alone is confidential,
the commission parallels a grand jury in its operation. This is
the least restrictive means of achieving the legislative goal
while still preserving some public right of access.
But most states extend confidentiality further. There are the
borderline cases where the record is later made available to
the public. This abridges the public's rights more than is nec-
essary but preserves the appearance of justice. Another bor-
derline case is where confidentiality depends upon the wishes
of the judge under investigation. This ignores the separate
public interest in open proceedings and is overly restrictive.
Whether these borderline cases are constitutionally permissi-
ble depends upon the weight given to First Amendment rights
by those deciding the question.1 23 In view of the less restrictive
alternative available, their constitutionality is doubtful.
Some states make disclosure of confidential proceedings
before their commission a punishable offense. After
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,1 2 4 such provi-
sions are clearly unconstitutional, at least insofar as they are
applied to third persons.
Most restrictive are rules which provide for confidentiality of
all proceedings with only the final outcome made public. This
protects the interests on one side of the balance only and ig-
nores completely the rights of the public. Such rules are im-
permissible restrictions on First Amendment rights and, as
such, are unconstitutional.
The time for secrecy in investigations of the judiciary has
passed. As the other branches of government are being sub-
jected to public scrutiny, so must the judicial branch. Perhaps
some degree of secrecy is necessary in order to protect the ju-
diciary from political pressure and frivolous charges. But once
a judge has been accused of misconduct or incapacity, and
123. See note 31, supra, and accompanying text.
124. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). See text accompanying note 113, supra.
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good cause for the charge has been shown, the public must be
allowed to observe the subsequent proceedings. This scrutiny
alone will advance public acceptance of the courts' legitimacy
and permit informed decision-making by citizens when they
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